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THE HEALTH CARE CASES AND  
THE NEW MEANING OF COMMANDEERING  
Bradley W. Joondeph∗ 
 The Supreme Court’s decision in the Health Care Cases to sustain the central 
provisions of the Affordable Care Act (or ACA) was hugely important in several ways. 
Most commentators have focused on the Court’s upholding of the ACA’s minimum 
coverage provision. But the Court’s Medicaid holding—that the ACA coerced (and thus 
commandeered) the states by making their preexisting Medicaid funds contingent on 
the states’ expanding their programs—may actually be more significant as a matter of 
constitutional law.   
 The basic thesis of this article is that, in finding the ACA’s Medicaid expansion 
provisions coercive, the Court has re-conceptualized what constitutes a federal 
“command” to the states, and thus re-defined the scope of the anti-commandeering 
principle. The Court’s holding means that federal laws can constitute commands even 
when they do not legally compel the states to act. The relevant inquiry is now practical 
rather than formal: has Congress left the states with a “real option” of saying no to the 
federal government’s conditions? This is an important shift. Not only does it potentially 
jeopardize a range of federal spending programs, but it also affects laws operating on 
the states as “conditional prohibitions”—federal statutes conditionally preempting state 
law. Until now, such statutes have been considered fully consistent with the anti-
commandeering doctrine because they do not formally require the states to act. But the 
Health Care Cases upend this understanding. If, as a practical matter, the states have 
no “genuine choice” but to govern on a particular subject, Congress’s conditions 
specifying how that subject must be governed (to avoid federal preemption) may well 
amount unconstitutional commandeerings. 
 This new understanding could be particularly troubling in the field of state and 
local taxation. The number, complexity, and heterogeneity of state and local tax 
systems almost certainly impose a number of unnecessary costs on the American 
economy. And as the Court itself has long recognized, Congress is much better suited 
institutionally than the judiciary to address these problems. An anti-commandeering 
doctrine that disempowers Congress from enacting laws that meaningfully regulate 
state taxation would be unfortunate.    
                                                          
∗ Professor, Santa Clara University School of Law.  Thanks to Sam 
Bagenstos, David Franklin, Kyle Graham, David Hasen, David Sloss, and the 
participants in a faculty colloquium at the University of San Diego School of 
Law for their input at various stages in this article’s development. I am 
indebted to Brandon Douglass, Christopher Glass, Jennifer McAllister, Rick 
Prasad, and Kimberly Sesay for their invaluable research assistance.  This 
article was made possible by a summer research grant from Santa Clara 
University School of Law. 
3 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 The Supreme Court’s decision in National Federation of 
Independent Business v. Sebelius1 (better known as the Health Care 
Cases) is easily the most important the Court has handed down since 
John Roberts became Chief Justice in 2005, and it may prove one of 
the most significant in the Court’s history.  In upholding the central 
provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (or ACA), 
the Court effectively ratified the most important federal statute in two 
generations.2  If fully implemented, the ACA could fundamentally 
transform the delivery and financing of health care in the United 
States, a sector comprising nearly one-fifth of the American economy.3  
Further, assuming the Act goes into effect, it will make access to 
health coverage for all Americans—regardless of income, health, or job 
status—a permanent component of our basic social contract.4  As such, 
                                                          
1 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
2 See Jack Balkin, The Court Affirms Our Social Contract, THE ATLANTIC, 
June 29, 2012, available at 
http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2012/06/the-court-affirms-our-
social-contract/259186/ (“The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 
2010 made the most significant change to the American social contract since 
the Great Society programs of the 1960s.”). 
3 See, e.g., David Gamage, How the Affordable Care Act Will Create Perverse 
Incentives Harming Low and Moderate Income Workers, TAX L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2067138 (the ACA 
“is the most extensive reform to the American healthcare system since the 
creation of Medicare and Medicaid in 1965); The Future of Nursing: Leading 
Change, Advancing Health Recommendations from the IOM/RWJF Initiative 
on the Future of Nursing, available at http://www.cinhc.org/wordpress/wp-
content/uploads/2011/02/IOM-reportsummary.pdf (“The ACA represents the 
broadest changes to the health care system since the 1965 creation of the 
Medicare and Medicaid programs and is expected to provide insurance 
coverage for an additional 32 million previously uninsured Americans.”). 
4 See Ronald Dworkin, A Bigger Victory Than We Knew, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, 
Aug. 16, 2012, available at 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2012/aug/16/bigger-victory-we-
knew/; Joey Fishkin, A Massive Victory for Liberalism, BALKINIZATION, June 
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the ACA may soon become a fixed stone in our constitutional 
foundation—something akin to Social Security, Medicare, or the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964—with which all viable political movements (and 
constitutional theories) will need to come to terms.5 
 Most commentary has focused on that part of the decision 
sustaining the ACA’s minimum coverage provision (or “individual 
mandate”) as a valid exercise of Congress’s taxing power.6  But there 
was another important question presented, one that may actually 
have been more significant as a matter of constitutional law: whether 
the ACA’s substantial expansion of the Medicaid program was within 
Congress’s spending power.  Medicaid is the joint federal-state 
spending program that provides health insurance to the indigent and 
the disabled.  A state’s participation in the program is voluntary, but 
once a state opts in, it must adhere to various federal statutory and 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
29, 2012, available at http://balkin.blogspot.com/2012/06/massive-victory-for-
liberalism.html. 
5 Balkin, supra note 2; Fishkin, supra note 4; Barry Friedman, Obamacare 
and the Court: Handing Health Policy Back to the People, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 
July 16, 2012, available at 
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137779/barry-friedman/obamacare-
and-the-court?page=show (noting that if “Obama wins a second term, then 
the health-care law will likely abecome entrenched alongside long-standing 
social welfare programs such as Socil Security and Medicare”).  Cf. Bruce 
Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1737 (2008) 
(describing the phenomenon by which certain “landmark statutes” become 
quasi-constitutional in nature, in that they shape interpretations of the 
Constitution as much as the text itself). 
6 See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 2; Fishkin, supra note 4; Richard A. 
Epstein, Taxation and regulation under the health care 
act, SCOTUSBLOG (Jun. 28, 2012, 12:05 PM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/06/taxation-and-regulation-under-the-
health-care-act/; Abigail R. Moncrieff, Understanding the Failure of Health-
Care Exceptionalism in the Supreme Court’s Obamacare Decision, Boston 
Univ. School of Law Pub. Research Paper No. 12-37, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2109396; Ilya Shapiro, We won everything but the 
case, SCOTUSBLOG (Jun. 29, 2012, 9:38 AM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/06/we-won-everything-but-the-case/; Robin 
West, Justice Roberts’ America, Georgetown Pub. Res. Paper No. 12–112, 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2120523.  
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administrative regulations.7  The ACA adds to these regulations—
most notably, by requiring states, beginning in 2014, to extend 
coverage to all adults under the age of 65 with incomes up to 133 
percent of the federal poverty level.8  The federal government will fund 
most of this coverage expansion, but not all of it.9  Thus, the ACA 
increases the minimum cost to a participating state, and by a 
considerable amount. 
 The twenty-six state plaintiffs claimed that, by making the states’ 
preexisting Medicaid funding contingent on their willingness to 
expand their Medicaid programs, the ACA’s conditions are coercive, 
and hence a “commandeering”—an unconstitutional command to the 
states to govern according to Congress’s direction.10  In the Health 
Care Cases, seven justices agreed.11  Chief Justice Roberts’s 
controlling opinion explained that, to be sure, Congress could require 
the states to adhere to the ACA’s conditions in order to qualify for the 
ACA’s new funding for Medicaid expansion.12  But Congress could not 
require the states to participate in the ACA’s “new program” on pain 
of losing their funding for the existing, pre-ACA Medicaid program—a 
program the justices characterized as separate and distinct.  
Threatening states with the loss of their existing Medicaid funding 
streams—funds constituting, on average, more than 10 percent of a 
state’s annual budget—“is much more than ‘relatively mild 
encouragement’—it is a gun to the head.”13  Because the Act offered 
                                                          
7 See 42 U.S.C. § 1396c; Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 502 
(1990); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 301 (1980). 
8 See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act §2001(a)(1); Health Care 
and Education Reconciliation Act §1004. 
9 See Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act §1201. 
10 Brief of State Petitioners on Medicaid at 24–53 Florida v. U.S. Dept. of 
Health & Human Servs., No. 11–400 (S. Ct. Jan. 10, 2012). 
11 National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 
2601–08 (2012) (opinion of Roberts, C.J.); id. at 2656–68 (joint opinion of 
Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito). 
12 Id. at 2607 (“Nothing in our opinion precludes Congress from offering funds 
under the Affordable Care Act to expand the availability of health care, and 
requiring that States accepting such funds comply with the conditions on 
their use.”) 
13 Id. at 2604 (quoting South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 212 (1987)). 
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the states no “genuine choice” or “real option” other than to implement 
the ACA’s Medicaid expansion, reasoned the Chief Justice, it 
“‘require[d] the States to govern according to Congress’ 
instructions,’”14 violating the structural principles of federalism. 
 The basic thesis of this article is that, in finding the ACA’s 
Medicaid expansion provisions coercive, the Court has re-
conceptualized what constitutes a federal command to the states, and 
consequently re-defined the scope of the anti-commandeering 
principle.  Previously, the Court had invalidated federal statutes as 
commandeerings only when those statutes formally compelled the 
states to govern in a particular fashion.15  But the underlying 
rationale of the Health Care Cases is that federal laws can constitute 
commands even when they do not legally require the states to act.  
The relevant inquiry is now practical rather than formal.  What 
matters is whether Congress has left the states with a “real option” of 
saying no to the federal government’s conditions. 
 This is an important shift.  As many commentators have 
recognized, it potentially jeopardizes a range of federal spending 
programs.16  If the relevant federal enticements leave the states with 
no practical choice but to conform to Congress’s instructions—as in the 
case of the ACA’s Medicaid provisions—the conditions attached to that 
largesse must now be seen as commands.  But the implications go 
much further.  This new meaning of commandeering also affects 
federal laws operating on the states as “conditional prohibitions,” 
statutes that conditionally preempt state law.  Such statutes are quite 
common in the United States Code,17 and they offer the states a choice 
                                                          
14 Id. at 2602 (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 162 (1992)). 
15 See  Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); New York, 505 U.S. 144. 
16 See, e.g., Jonathan Adler & Nathaniel Stewart, Positive Steps, Silver 
Linings, NATIONAL REV., July 30, 2012, available at 
http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/309154/positive-steps-silver-linings-
jonathan-h-adler (“Given how often Congress seeks to use the spending 
power, the Court’s decision may open a new front in the war to reinvigorate 
constitutional federalism, and occasion a reexamination of statutes from No 
Child Left Behind to the Clean Air Act.”). 
17 They include, for example, such prominent laws as the Clean Water Act, 86 
Stat. 816, as amended, 33 U.S.C. §1251 et seq.; the Occupational Safety and 
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of either governing according to a specific set of federal instructions or 
having their laws on the subject preempted.   
 Until now, federal statutes conditionally preempting state law 
have been considered fully consistent with the anti-commandeering 
doctrine, as they do not legally compel the states to act.18  States that 
dislike the federal government’s specified terms can simply step aside 
and do nothing, allowing the federal government to regulate the 
subject itself.  The Health Care Cases upend this understanding.  The 
fact that a federal statute offers the states the formal option of 
stepping aside is no longer sufficient to immunize that statute from a 
commandeering challenge.  If, as a practical matter, states have no 
real choice but to govern on that subject, then Congress’s conditions 
amount to commands, and thus violate the anti-commandeering 
doctrine. 
 How much might this matter?  At this point it is unclear.  Much 
depends on how the Court defines the concept of “genuine choice,” a 
point left quite vague by the Health Care Cases.  But regardless how 
this standard is fleshed out, one place this new understanding could 
have an immediate impact is in the field of state and local taxation.  
 States and their political subdivisions impose all sorts of taxes that 
affect interstate commerce, and the Supreme Court has long held that 
the Commerce Clause grants Congress the authority to regulate how 
these taxes are imposed.19  Like other federal statutes that do not 
formally require the states to act, these statutes have always been 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Health Act of 1970, 84 Stat. 1590, 29 U.S.C. §651 et seq.; and the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 2796, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 
§6901 et seq.  See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167–68 (1992).  
18 See New York, 505 U.S. at 167 (“[W]here Congress has the authority to 
regulate private activity under the Commerce Clause, we have recognized 
Congress’ power to offer States the choice of regulating that activity 
according to federal standards or having state law pre-empted by federal 
regulation.”); FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 764–65 (1982); Hodel v. 
Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981). 
19 See, e.g., Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 318 (1992); Moorman 
Mfg. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 280 (1978); WALTER HELLERSTEIN, STATE 
TAXATION ¶ 4.24 (3d ed. 2010) (“Congress possesses unquestioned power 
under the Commerce Clause to regulate state taxation of interstate 
commerce.”); Part IV.A infra. 
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considered simpatico with the anti-commandeering principle—even 
when they dictate how particular state taxes are to be imposed—
because they afford states the formal option of not imposing the 
regulated tax at all.  But states must raise revenue to exist.  And 
because the states rely (to greater and lesser degrees) on the specific 
levies they presently impose, they may lack any practical choice but to 
continue imposing them.  (Indeed, the financial consequences to a 
state in forgoing a particular tax could be more severe than 
withdrawing from Medicaid.)  Hence, federal laws specifying the terms 
on which the states may implement such taxes, though not formally 
requiring the states to impose them, may now constitute 
impermissible commandeerings.   
 This would be unfortunate. The number, complexity, and 
heterogeneity of state and local tax systems almost certainly impose a 
number of unnecessary costs on the American economy.20  And as the 
Court itself has long recognized, Congress is much better suited 
institutionally than the judiciary, through its rather clumsy 
enforcement of the dormant Commerce Clause, to address these 
complex problems.21   
 This article proceeds in four parts.  Part I provides some 
background concerning the relevant points of constitutional law—
namely, the precise metes and bounds of the anti-commandeering 
principle.  Next, Part II sets out the details of the Supreme Court’s 
Medicaid holding in the Health Care Cases.  Part III then explains 
how this holding has effectively re-conceptualized the meaning of 
federal commands to state governments, and thus extended the reach 
of the anti-commandeering principle.  Finally, Part IV presents the 
federal regulation of state and local taxes as a case study, illustrating 
                                                          
20 See Daniel Shaviro, An Economic and Political Look at Federalism in 
Taxation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 895, 898–930 (1992); Part IV.C infra. 
21 See, e.g., Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609 (1981) 
(White, J., concurring); Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. 
Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 476 (1959) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); McCarroll 
v. Dixie Greyhound Lines, 309 U.S. 176, 188–89 (1940) (Black, J., dissenting); 
JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN & WALTER HELLERSTEIN, STATE AND LOCAL 
TAXATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 205–08 (8th ed. 2005). 
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how the new meaning of commandeering may entail some troubling 
practical consequences. 
 
I.  THE ANTI-COMMANDEERING PRINCIPLE (AND ITS LIMITS) 
A.  The central idea 
It is well settled that Congress lacks the power to command the 
states (or their political subdivisions) to govern their residents in a 
particular fashion.22  As the Supreme Court has explained, any such 
“commandeering” of state governments is “inconsistent with the 
federal structure of our Government established by the 
Constitution.”23  Two decisions from the 1990s, New York v. United 
States24 and Printz v. United States,25 cemented this principle into 
constitutional doctrine (though arguably the rule predates those 
decisions considerably).26   
                                                          
22 See National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 
2566, 2602 (2012) (“‘[T]he Constitution has never been understood to confer 
upon Congress the ability to require the States to govern according to 
Congress’ instructions.’”) (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 
162 (1992)); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND 
POLICIES §3.9, at 324 (3d ed. 2006); KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD 
GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 142 (17th ed. 2010); Neil S. Siegel, 
Commandeering and Its Alternatives: A Federalism Perspective, 59 VAND. L. 
REV. 1629, 1642 (2006). 
23 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 177 (1992).  
24 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
25 521 U.S. 898 (1992). 
26 See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, Inc., 452 U.S. 
264, 288 (1981) (holding that the challenged statute was constitutional 
because there was “no suggestion that the Act commandeers the legislative 
processes of the States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a 
federal regulatory program”); FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 765 (1982) 
(upholding the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act in part on the ground 
that there was “nothing in PURPA ‘directly compelling’ the States to enact a 
legislative program”).  See also South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 513 
(1988); Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 
556 (1985); Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 565 (1911). 
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In New York, the Court struck down the so-called “take title” 
provision of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments of 
1985, which had directed the states either (a) to regulate low-level 
radioactive waste “according to the instructions of Congress,” or (b) to 
accept title to all such waste generated within their borders (an 
enormous financial liability).27  The Court held that “[e]ither type of 
federal action would ‘commandeer’ state governments into the service 
of the federal regulatory purposes, and would for this reason be 
inconsistent with the Constitution’s division of authority between 
federal and state governments.”28  Similarly, the Court in Printz 
invalidated an interim provision of the Brady Handgun Violence 
Prevention Act that directed state or local Chief Law Enforcement 
Officers to conduct background checks on persons seeking to purchase 
handguns.29  Summarizing its holding in plain terms, the Court 
declared that the “federal government may neither issue directives 
requiring the States to address particular problems, nor command the 
States’ officers, or those of their political subdivisions, to administer or 
enforce a federal regulatory program.”30 
Though important—perhaps even foundational—this anti-
commandeering principle is narrower than might first appear.  There 
are three important limits to its reach: (1) it only applies to federal 
laws regulating the states in their sovereign capacities, as regulators 
or governors of their inhabitants; (2) it only forbids federal laws that 
require the states to take affirmative acts, not those merely 
prohibiting state action; and (3) it does not forbid Congress from 
enticing the states to regulate or govern in particular ways, even if 
Congress could not command the states to do the same.  The 
remainder of this Part explains these limits in turn.   
B.  States in their sovereign and proprietary capacities 
A critical limit on the anti-commandeering principle is that it only 
forbids federal laws that dictate how a state regulates or governs.  It 
                                                          
27 New York, 505 U.S. at 175–77. 
28 Id. at 175. 
29 Printz, 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
30 Id. at 935. 
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does not address the scores of federal laws that regulate the states’ 
behavior in other roles, such as when they act as employers, 
proprietors, or polluters.31  So-called “generally applicable 
legislation”—like the Fair Labor Standards Act,32 which imposes 
minimum-wage and maximum-hour requirements on all employers in 
the United States of a certain size33—does not “commandeer” the 
states because it does not force them to implement, administer, or 
enforce federal law.34  Rather, such legislation merely requires state 
governments to conform their behavior to a particular federal norm, a 
norm imposed on every entity in the country engaged in that same 
activity.  Statutes like the FLSA treat the states as objects of federal 
regulation, not as tools for the implementation of a federal legislative 
program.35   
The Supreme Court in 1985 upheld Congress’s application of such 
generally applicable laws (like the FLSA) to state governments and 
their political subdivisions in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan 
Transit Agency.36  And when the Court later decided New York and 
Printz, the justices were careful to distinguish Garcia, thus preserving 
its holding.37  Moreover, in 2000 the Court reaffirmed Congress’s 
authority to regulate the conduct of the states through generally 
                                                          
31 See SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 22, at 142 (explaining that neither 
New York nor Printz “questioned Congress’s ability to regulate the states’ 
own conduct under general laws that also regulate the similar conduct of 
private actors”). 
32 209 U.S.C. §201 et seq. (2012). 
33 See id. §§ 203(d), 203(e)(2), 206–207 (2012). 
34 See Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 151 (2000) (concluding that, because the 
challenged federal law did “not require the States in their sovereign capacity 
to regulate their own citizens,” but instead “regulate[d] the States as the 
owners of data bases,” it was “consistent with the constitutional principles 
enunciated in New York and Printz”).  Cf. Printz, 521 U.S. at 932; New York, 
505 U.S. at 161. 
35 See SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 22, at 142. 
36 Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Agency, 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
37 See Printz, 521 U.S. at 932; New York, 505 U.S. at 160–61; Matthew D. 
Adler & Seth F. Kreimer, The New Etiquette of Federalism: New York, Printz, 
and Yetsky, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 71, 110. 
12 
 
applicable legislation in Reno v. Condon,38 thus attesting to Garcia’s 
continuing vitality.39  As the Court explained in Condon, the 
challenged federal statute (the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act) was 
constitutional because it “regulates the States as the owners of data 
bases,” not “in their sovereign capacity to regulate their own 
citizens.”40 
C.  Prohibitions and commands to act 
 A second important limit on the anti-commandeering principle is 
that it only forbids federal laws that command state governments to 
take affirmative steps in regulating or governing their residents.  It 
does not extend to mere prohibitions—commands that states not 
regulate in a particular fashion.  This must be so, for otherwise the 
anti-commandeering principle would swallow up the doctrine of 
preemption, a doctrine essentially dictated by the text of the 
Constitution itself.   
The Supremacy Clause of Article VI provides that “[t]his 
Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made 
in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, 
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of 
the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any 
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary 
notwithstanding.”41  Since the earliest days of the Republic, this 
language has been understood as dictating that, when federal law and 
a state law conflict, the state law—whether in the form of a state 
constitutional provision, statute, administrative regulation, or 
common law rule of liability—is inoperable.42  A federal statute that 
                                                          
38 528 U.S. 141 (2000). 
39 Id. at 151. 
40 Id. 
41 U.S. CONST. art. VI. 
42 See, e.g., M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).  See also 
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (“since our decision 
in [M’Culloch], it has been settled that state law that conflicts with federal 
law is “without effect”) (quoting Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 
(1981)). 
13 
 
preempts state law—most obviously, when it does so through an 
express preemption clause—is, in essence, a command by Congress 
that the states not regulate or govern in a particular way.  Thus, if the 
anti-commandeering principle and the doctrine of preemption are to 
coexist, the former can only apply to directives requiring the states 
affirmatively to act.  Federal commands that states not regulate 
cannot be a commandeering.43 
This distinction between prohibitions and mandates to take 
affirmative acts may be somewhat artificial, especially at the edges.  
As the lengthy debate as to whether the ACA’s minimum coverage 
provision regulates “activity” or “inactivity” illustrated, prohibitions 
can often be re-characterized as commands to act, and vice-versa.44  
Still, the action-inaction distinction is generally respected in law,45 
                                                          
43 See Siegel, supra note 22 (distinguishing preemption from commandeering, 
while noting that the former might actually interfere more with a state’s 
sovereign interests); Rachel Preiser, Note, Staking Out the Border Between 
Commandeering and Conditional Preemption: Is the Driver’s Privacy 
Protection Act Constitutional Under the Tenth Amendment?, 98 MICH. L. REV. 
514, 537 (1999) (“The New York and Printz Courts recognized the 
constitutionality of federal preemption of state law, thereby affirming the 
distinction between preemption and impermissible federal commandeering of 
the states.”). 
44 For instance, consider §201(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  It provides 
that “[a]ll persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the 
goods, services, facilities, and privileges, advantages, and accommodations of 
any place of public accommodation, as defined in this section, without 
discrimination or segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, or 
national origin.”  42 U.S.C. §2000a(a) (2012).  The Act further provides that 
all hotels are “places of public accommodation.”  See id. §2000a(b)(1).  Does 
this provision merely prohibit hotels from engaging in discrimination on the 
basis of race, color, religion, or national origin?  Or does it compel hoteliers 
into action, forcing them to let rooms to persons whom they otherwise might 
not serve? 
45 Indeed, it was critical to the Court’s conclusion in the Health Care Cases 
that the minimum coverage provision, because it regulated “inactivity,” 
exceeded Congress’s authority to regulate interstate commerce.  See National 
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2589 (2012) 
(“To an economist, perhaps, there is no difference between activity and 
inactivity . . . . But the distinction between doing something and doing 
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and it accurately captures the Court’s precise descriptions of the anti-
commandeering principle in its opinions—descriptions that 
presumably were crafted with the implications for preemption 
doctrine in mind.  For instance, the Court stated in Condon that the 
Driver’s Privacy Protection Act did not commandeer the states 
because “[i]t does not require the South Carolina Legislature to enact 
any laws or regulations, and it does not require state officials to assist 
in the enforcement of federal statutes regulating private 
individuals.”46  As such, this action-prohibition distinction is widely 
accepted as setting a boundary between unconstitutional 
commandeerings and permissible regulations. 
D.  Commands, enticements, and coercion 
A final limitation on the anti-commandeering principle—and the 
one most immediately relevant in the Health Care Cases—is that, 
though Congress cannot command the states to take affirmative steps 
to govern in a particular fashion, nothing precludes Congress from 
encouraging the states to do the same through the enticement of 
federal largesse.  The first clause of Article I, section 8 grants 
Congress the authority to “lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and 
Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and 
general Welfare of the United States.”47  Congress can use this 
spending power to offer funding to state governments on the condition 
they accept certain strings that come attached.  To be sure, the 
spending program must promote the “general welfare”; the spending 
conditions must be germane to the purposes of the spending program; 
the conditions must be unambiguous (so the states can fully 
appreciate the obligations they are accepting); and the conditions 
cannot induce the states to act unconstitutionally.48   But assuming 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
nothing would not have been lost on the Framers, who were ‘practical 
statesmen,’ not metaphysical philosophers.”) (quoting Industrial Union Dept., 
AFL–CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 673 (1980) (Rehnquist, 
J., concurring in judgment)). 
46 Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 151 (2000). 
47 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
48 See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 205, 207–11 (1986). 
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these rather minimal requirements are satisfied, nothing prevents 
Congress from achieving indirectly (through conditional spending) 
what would constitute an impermissible commandeering if directly 
compelled.  As the Court explained in New York, when Congress 
employs such a “permissible method of encouraging a State to conform 
to federal policy choices, the residents of the State retain the ultimate 
decision as to whether or not the State will comply.”49 
Critical to the constitutionality of such conditional spending, of 
course, is that the states’ acceptance of the strings attached to the 
federal dollars is voluntary.  If the conditions were actually 
commands, they would amount to a commandeering (assuming those 
conditions required the states to take affirmative steps in their 
sovereign capacities).  A natural question, then, is whether the terms 
imposed on the states’ receipt of federal funds—funds to which the 
states have no constitutional entitlement—can ever be so coercive as 
to constitute compulsion.   
Two Supreme Court decisions predating the Health Care Cases 
suggested that they could.  In the 1987 case of South Dakota v. Dole,50 
the Court acknowledged that “[o]ur decisions have recognized that in 
some circumstances the financial inducement offered by Congress 
might be so coercive as to pass the point at which ‘pressure turns into 
compulsion.’”51  This sentence in Dole quoted the Court’s 1937 decision 
in Steward Machine Co. v. Davis,52 a case in which the Court proffered 
a similar suggestion.  Specifically, in upholding the federal spending 
program at issue, the Steward Machine Court noted that “[n]othing in 
the case suggests the exertion of a power akin to undue influence.”53   
Read in their entirety, though, Dole and Steward Machine are 
enigmatic.  Only five sentences after seeming to concede (in the 
language quoted above) that spending conditions can be coercive, the 
Dole Court threw some cold water on the idea: 
 
                                                          
49 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168 (1992). 
50 438 U.S. 203 (1987). 
51 Dole, 483 U.S. at 211 (quoting Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 
590 (1937)). 
52 301 U.S. 548 (1937). 
53 Id. at 590. 
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“[T]o hold that motive or temptation is equivalent to coercion is 
to plunge the law in endless difficulties.  The outcome of such a 
doctrine is the acceptance of a philosophical determinism by 
which choice becomes impossible.  Till now the law has been 
guided by a robust common sense which assumes the freedom 
of the will as a working hypothesis in the solution of its 
problems.”54 
 
This, too, was a direct quote from Steward Machine.  And a closer 
examination of Steward Machine reveals that the Court was really 
just assuming arguendo the existence of a coercion doctrine.  Here is 
the relevant passage from Steward Machine in its entirety: 
 
Nothing in the case suggests the exertion of a power akin to 
undue influence, if we assume that such a concept can ever be 
applied with fitness to the relations between state and nation.  
Even on that assumption the location of the point at which 
pressure turns into compulsion, and ceases to be inducement, 
would be a question of degree, at times, perhaps, of fact.55 
 
Thus, while Dole and Steward Machine were often cited for the 
proposition that “Congress may not employ the spending power in 
such a way as to ‘coerce’ the states into compliance with the federal 
objective,”56 it was unclear, as of June 27, 2012, whether this was 
actually a governing rule of constitutional law.  The Supreme Court 
had never invalidated a federal spending condition imposed on the 
                                                          
54 Dole, 483 U.S. at 211 (quoting Steward Machine, 301 U.S. at 589–90).   
55 Steward Machine, 301 U.S. at 590 (emphasis added). 
56 Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1264 
(11th Cir. 2011), rev’d, National Federation of Independent Business v. 
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).  See also Van Wyhe v. Reisch, 581 F.3d 639, 
650 (8th Cir. 2009); School District of City of Pontiac v. Secretary of U.S. 
Dept. of Educ., 512 F.3d 252, 277 n.2 (6th Cir. 2008); Madison v. Virginia, 474 
F.3d 118, 124 (4th Cir. 2006); Pace v. Bogalusa City Sch. Bd., 403 F.3d 272, 
278–79 (5th Cir. 2005); Nieves-Marquez v. Puerto Rico, 353 F.3d 108, 128 (1st 
Cir. 2003). 
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states as coercive.  Nor had any other court, at any level, in the history 
of the United States.  The Health Case Cases changed things. 
 
II.  THE HEALTH CARE CASES 
 
 The Court’s decision in the Health Care Cases was a big, big deal.  
In sustaining the central provisions of the ACA, the Court placed its 
imprimatur on a hugely important federal statute—one with the 
potential to fundamentally alter the terms of the modern welfare 
state.57  Perhaps as important, the Chief Justice’s opinion was a 
master stroke of judicial statesmanship.58  In this most partisan of 
cases, Roberts crossed ideological lines to uphold President Obama’s 
defining legislative achievement, enabling the Court to claim the 
mantles of bipartisanship and judicial modesty.59  This elevation of the 
Court above the polarized, partisan fray may prove quite valuable to 
its long-term institutional standing.60  It will buffer the Court, at least 
                                                          
57 See Balkin, supra note 2; Fishkin, supra note 4. 
58 See Bradley Joondeph, A Marbury for our time, SCOTUSBLOG (Jun. 29, 
2012, 2:36 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/06/a-marbury-for-our-time/.  
59 See Erwin Chemerinsky, A surprise?, SCOTUSBLOG (Jun. 29, 2012, 9:27 
AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/06/a-surprise/; Jeffrey Rosen, Big Chief: 
How to Understand John Roberts, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 2, 2012.  But see 
David Bernstein, Rosen on Roberts as Statesman, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY, July 
15, 2012, available at http://www.volokh.com/2012/07/15/rosen-on-roberts-as-
statesman/ (contending that “one thing seems pretty certain: the way Roberts 
handled the case has not actually served the goal of enhancing the Court’s 
reputation of being “above politics”). 
60 See David L. Franklin, Why Did Roberts Do It? To Save the Court, SLATE, 
June 28, 2012, available at 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2012/06/john_r
oberts_broke_with_conservatives_to_preserve_the_supreme_court_s_legitima
cy.html; Friedman, Obamacare, supra note ___; Adam Winkler, The Roberts 
Court is born,SCOTUSBLOG (Jun. 28, 2012, 12:01 PM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/06/the-roberts-court-is-born/.  But see Ilya 
Somin, The Impact of the Individual Mandate Decision on the Supreme 
Court’s Legitimacy, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY, July 13, 2012, available at 
http://www.volokh.com/2012/07/13/the-impact-of-the-individual-mandate-
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for some time, from attacks that the five Republican appointees are 
“conservative judicial activists.”61  If the Roberts Court tacks more 
conservatively on issues like affirmative action, voting rights, or the 
separation of national powers—a possibility that hardly seems 
remote—the predictable accusations of partisanship are less likely to 
stick.  The Health Case Cases will stand as a super-salient counter-
example. 
 Much of the commentary on the Court’s decision thus far has 
focused on the Court’s upholding of the individual mandate, the 
linchpin of the ACA’s broader regulation of the individual insurance 
market.  This was the provision that several lower courts had held 
exceeded Congress’s enumerated powers,62 and which—given its 
centrality to the Act’s regulatory scheme—threatened to bring down 
the entire ACA (if the Supreme Court found it both unconstitutional 
and inseverable).  But the Court also decided a second very important 
question in the Health Care Cases, one that many believe was actually 
more significant as a matter of constitutional law.63  That question 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
decision-on-the-supreme-courts-legitimacy/ (arguing that the decision may 
have detracted from the Court’s legitimacy more than it enhanced it). 
61 See, e.g., Editorial, It’s Nice To Be Rich, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2008 (calling 
the Court’s decision in Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724 (2008), “conservative 
judicial activism of the first order”); Adam Cohen, Last Term’s Winner at the 
Supreme Court: Judicial Activism, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2007 (arguing that the 
Roberts Court was embracing a “new conservative judicial activism”). 
62 See Florida v. U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 (11th 
Cir. 2011); Goudy-Bachman v. U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Servs., 811 F. 
Supp. 2d 1086 (M.D. Pa 2011); Florida v. U.S. Dept. of Health & Human 
Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256 (N.D. Fla. 2011); Virginia v. Sebelius, 702 F. 
Supp. 2d 598 (W.D. Va. 2010). 
63 See, e.g., Charles Fried, The June surprises: Balls, strikes, and the fog of 
war, SCOTUSBLOG (Aug. 2, 2012, 12:19 PM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/08/the-june-surprises-balls-strikes-and-the-
fog-of-war/ (“But the Commerce Clause activity/inactivity argument is so 
artificial and strained that at the end of the day it may not be very 
constraining, easily gotten around by skillful drafting.  The Medicaid 
expansion invalidation, however, has potential for cutting a broad swath 
through many programs hitherto seen as unassailable under the rubric of 
cooperative federalism.”); Pamela S. Karlan, No Respite for Liberals, N.Y. 
19 
 
was whether the ACA coerced the states into participating in the Act’s 
massive expansion of the Medicaid program, thus exceeding the scope 
of Congress’s spending power. 
A.  The ACA’s expansion of Medicaid 
 Again, Medicaid is the joint federal-state spending program that 
offers health insurance to the indigent and the disabled.  States are 
not required to participate in the program.64  But if they do, they must 
abide by a variety of standards to qualify for the associated federal 
funding (known as the “federal medical assistance percentage,” or 
FMAP).65  The size of the FMAP varies by state, generally ranging 
from 50 to 83 percent of the program’s costs.66  Congress originally 
enacted Medicaid in 1965 as Title XIX of the Social Security Act, and 
it is now the single largest federal aid program to the states, 
accounting for 45 percent of all federal grant-in-aid to state 
governments.67  It is the third largest domestic spending program 
(behind only Social Security and Medicare), providing health coverage 
to nearly 60 million Americans and accounting for 8 percent of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
TIMES, Jun. 30, 2012 (“That the individual mandate was upheld should not 
overshadow the court’s ruling on Medicaid expansion—the part of the ruling 
that is most likely to affect other legislation in the near future.”); Gillian 
Metzger, Something for everyone, SCOTUSBLOG(Jun. 28, 2012, 5:08 PM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/06/something-for-everyone/ (“The Spending 
Clause ruling portends greater import.”); Erin Ryan, Spending Power 
Bargaining After Sebelius, at 1 (2012), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2119241 (“[T]he most immediately significant 
portion of the ruling—and one with far more significance for most regulatory 
governance—is the part of the decision limiting the federal spending power 
that authorizes Medicaid.”). 
64 See Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431, 433 (2004); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 
297, 301 (1980). 
65 See 42 U.S.C. §1396c (2012); Frew, 540 U.S. at 433; Wilder v. Virginia 
Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 502 (1990); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. at 301. 
66 42 U.S.C. §1396d(b). 
67 KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, MEDICAID 
MATTERS: UNDERSTANDING MEDICAID’S ROLE IN OUR HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 2 
(2011), available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/8165.pdf. 
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federal budget.68  Medicaid’s present role in the states’ finances is 
staggering:  In fiscal year 2008, state governments collectively spent 
16.3 percent of their general fund dollars on Mediciad, and the 
program accounted for 20.7 percent of state spending in total.69 
 Wholly aside from the ACA, federal law imposes numerous 
requirements on states that participate in Medicaid (all of which do).70  
If a state fails to comply with these requirements, ‘‘the Secretary [of 
Health and Human Services] shall notify such State agency that 
further payments will not be made to the State (or, in his discretion, 
that payments will be limited to categories under or parts of the State 
plan not affected by such failure), until the Secretary is satisfied that 
there will no longer be any such failure to comply.”71  At the same 
time, federal law has always afforded states a fair degree of flexibility 
in structuring their own distinct Medicaid programs.72  Historically, 
the states have retained discretion over matters such as coverage 
eligibility levels, provider reimbursement rates, and (with some 
limitations) the range of services covered.73 
 The ACA reduced this state-level discretion.  Most importantly, 
the Act imposed three new, related requirements: (1) states must 
extend their coverage to non-disabled childless adults under the age of 
6574; (2) they must, at a minimum, set their coverage eligibility level 
at 133 percent of the federal poverty level (in practice, actually 138 
percent of the federal poverty level)75; and (3) they must guarantee all 
                                                          
68 Id. at 1–2. 
69 KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, HOPING FOR 
ECONOMIC RECOVERY, PREPARING FOR HEALTH REFORM: A LOOK AT MEDICAID 
SPENDING, COVERAGE AND POLICY TRENDS 11 & Figure 3 (2010), available at 
http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/8105.pdf. 
70 See generally 42 U.S.C. §1396a(a) (2012). 
71 42 U.S.C. §1396c (2012). 
72 See Brief for Respondents (Medicaid) at 3–8, Florida v. Dept. of Health & 
Human Servs., No. 11–400 (S. Ct. Feb. 2012). 
73 See National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 
2566, 2601 (2012). 
74 Id. 
75 Section 2001(a)(1) of the ACA mandates that, beginning in 2014, states 
must provide coverage to all individuals under the age of 65 (including 
childless adults) with incomes under 133 percent of the federal poverty level. 
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covered individuals a so-called “benchmark” benefits package.76  
Together, these provisions constitute a substantial expansion of the 
program: participating states must provide minimum, benchmark 
coverage to all their non-elderly residents with incomes up to 138 
percent of the federal poverty level.   
 Until now, Medicaid has never included non-disabled childless 
adults.  And presently the median state eligibility level is only 63 
percent of the federal poverty level.77  (Indeed, seventeen states have 
eligibility cutoffs that are below half the federal poverty rate.78)  The 
ACA (if all states participate) will thus increase enrollment in 
Medicaid by somewhere between 16 and 23 million individuals by 
2019.79  The federal government will reimburse states for the bulk of 
the costs attributable to this expansion, but it will not cover all of 
them.  As provided in §1201 of the Health Care and Education 
Reconciliation Act—the law enacted three days after the ACA to 
amend some of its provisions—the United States will pay for 100 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Given the definition of modified adjusted gross income dictated by §1004 of 
the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act, this effectively means 138 
percent of the federal poverty level.  For a more detailed explanation, see 
KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, EXPLAINING HEALTH 
REFORM: THE NEW RULES FOR DETERMINING INCOME UNDER MEDICIAD IN 2014 
(2011), available at www.kff.org/healthreform/upload/8194.pdf. 
76 42 U.S.C. §§1396a(k)(1), 1396u–7(b)(5), 18022(b) (2012). 
77 See KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, PERFORMING 
UNDER PRESSURE: ANNUAL FINDINGS OF A 50-STATE SURVEY OF ELIGIBILITY, 
ENROLLMENT, RENEWAL, AND COST-SHARING POLICIES IN MEDICAID AND CHIP, 
2011–2012, at 11 and fig.11 (Jan. 2012), available at 
http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/8272.pdf.  
78 UNDERSTANDING MEDICAID’S ROLE IN OUR HEALTH CARE SYSTEM, supra 
note 67, at 1. 
79 KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, MEDICAID 
COVERAGE AND SPENDING IN HEALTH REFORM: NATIONAL AND STATE-BY-STATE 
RESULTS FOR ADULTS AT OR BELOW 133% FPL, at 2–5 (May 2012), available at 
http://www.kff.org/healthreform/upload/medicaid-coverage-and-spending-in-
health-reform-national-and-state-by-state-results-for-adults-at-or-below-133-
fpl.pdf. 
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percent of these expenses from 2014 to 2016, 95 percent in 2017, 94 
percent in 2018, 93 percent in 2019, and 90 percent thereafter.80 
B.  The Supreme Court’s Medicaid holding 
 In their challenge to the ACA, the twenty-six state plaintiffs 
claimed that their existing, pre-ACA Medicaid funding streams are 
simply too massive for the states to have any real option of 
withdrawing from the program.81  The Act, they argued, “threatens 
States with the loss of every penny of federal funding under the single 
largest grant-in-aid program in existence—literally billions of dollars 
each year—if they do not capitulate to Congress’ steep new 
demands.”82  To them, there was “no plausible argument that a State 
could afford to turn down such a massive federal inducement, 
particularly when doing so would mean assuming the full burden of 
covering its neediest residents’ medical costs.”83   
 By a margin of 7-to-2, the Supreme Court agreed, though no single 
opinion garnered five votes.  Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and 
Alito would have invalidated the ACA’s Medicaid expansion in toto.84  
Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion, joined on this point by Justices Breyer 
and Kagan, was far less sweeping.  It concluded that the ACA’s 
Medicaid expansion conditions were indeed coercive, but only insofar 
as they operated as strings attached to the states’ existing Medicaid 
                                                          
80 Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act §1201 (codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§1396d(y)). 
81 See Brief of State Petitioners on Medicaid at 23, Florida v. U.S. Dept. of 
Health & Human Servs., No. 11–400 (S. Ct. Jan. 10, 2012). 
82 Id.  
83 Id.  
84 National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 
2643 (2012) (opinion of Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ.). 
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funding.85  As the narrowest rationale for sustaining the Court’s 
judgment, Roberts’s opinion on this point is controlling.86  
 The Chief Justice began his analysis by explaining that Congress 
could certainly “condition the receipt of funds on the States’ complying 
with restrictions on the use of those funds, because that is the means 
by which Congress ensures that the funds are spent according to its 
view of the ‘general Welfare.’”87  Under the ACA, though, the states’ 
failure to comply with the new conditions did not just jeopardize the 
funds the federal government was offering for Medicaid expansion.  
Rather, the conditions took “the form of threats to terminate other 
significant independent grants”—the states’ preexisting Medicaid 
dollars.88  Consequently, “the conditions are properly viewed as a 
means of pressuring the States to accept policy changes.”89   
 Such pressuring, achieved through the tool of conditional 
spending, is generally no more than “encouragement,” and thus 
perfectly constitutional.90  But in the ACA, explained Roberts, this 
pressure crossed the line into compulsion.91  The “financial 
‘inducement’ Congress has chosen is much more than ‘relatively mild 
encouragement,’” but instead “a gun to the head.”92  Again, 42 U.S.C. 
§1396c gives the Secretary the authority to terminate the entirety of a 
state’s federal Medicaid reimbursement if the state fails to comply 
                                                          
85 Id. at 2607 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (“What Congress is not free to do is to 
penalize States that choose not to participate in that new program by taking 
away their existing Medicaid funding.”). 
86 See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (“When a fragmented 
Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the 
assent of five Justices, ‘the holding of the Court may be viewed as that 
position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the 
narrowest grounds.’”) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 
(1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.)). 
87 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2603–04. 
88 Id. at 2604. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. (noting that the Court in Dole had “found that the inducement was not 
impermissibly coercive, because Congress was offering only ‘relatively mild 
encouragement to the States.’”). 
91 Id. 
92 Id. 
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with any of the Act’s requirements.  Thus, a state choosing not to 
expand its Medicaid coverage as prescribed by the ACA stood “to lose 
not merely ‘a relatively small percentage’ of its existing Medicaid 
funding, but all of it.”93  And the states’ dependence on the existing 
Medicaid program is stunning.  Not only is the states’ financial 
reliance on existing federal Medicaid reimbursements enormous,94 but 
the states “have developed intricate statutory and administrative 
regimes over the course of many decades to implement their objectives 
under existing Medicaid.”95  This dependence, reasoned the Chief 
Justice, means that Congress was effectively leaving the states with 
no choice:  “The threatened loss of over 10 percent of a State’s overall 
budget, in contrast [to the funds at issue in Dole], is economic 
dragooning that leaves the States with no real option but to acquiesce 
in the Medicaid expansion.”96 
 Importantly, reasoned Roberts, the Act’s Medicaid expansion did 
not simply constitute “a modification of the existing Medicaid 
program.”97  Instead, it represented “a new program,” a “shift in kind, 
not merely degree.”98  Under the ACA, “Medicaid is transformed 
into a program to meet the health care needs of the entire nonelderly 
population with income below 133 percent of the federal poverty 
level.”99  Rather than continuing as a “program to care for the neediest 
among us,” the ACA makes Medicaid “an element of a comprehensive 
national plan to provide universal health insurance coverage.”100  
Indeed, Congress recognized this qualitative shift in its structuring of 
the program’s expansion; there is a separate funding provision for 
those persons “newly eligible” for Medicaid, and the federal 
reimbursement rate for these recipients differs from that for those 
                                                          
93 Id. (emphasis original). 
94 Id. (“Medicaid spending accounts for over 20 percent of the average State's 
total budget, with federal funds covering 50 to 83 percent of those costs.”) 
95 Id. 
96 Id. at 2604–05. 
97 Id. at 2605. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. at 2606. 
100 Id. 
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previously eligible.101  Moreover, the states could hardly have 
anticipated such a significant change in Medicaid when they originally 
agreed to participate.102  No state could have expected that “Congress’s 
reservation of the right to ‘alter’ or ‘amend’ the Medicaid program 
included the power to transform it so dramatically.”103   
 Thus, Congress was not merely amending the terms under which 
states could spend dollars provided by the federal government.  
Congress was effectively forcing the states to implement the ACA’s 
distinct Medicaid-expansion program by “threatening the funds for the 
existing Medicaid program.”104  Given the states’ reliance on that 
existing program, this threat was coercive.105  Congress was effectively 
commanding the states to govern according to Congress’s 
instructions.106 
 This conclusion did not render the ACA’s expansion of Medicaid 
unconstitutional in its entirety, however.  It only meant that Congress 
could not “penalize States that choose not to participate in that new 
program by taking away their existing Medicaid funding.”107  Hence, 
forbidding the Secretary from applying §1396c “to withdraw existing 
Medicaid funds for failure to comply with the requirements set out in 
the expansion” fully remedied the constitutional violation.108  The 
Court therefore validated Congress’s authority to attach conditions to 
the ACA’s new funding:  “Nothing in our opinion precludes Congress 
from offering funds under the Affordable Care Act to expand the 
availability of health care, and requiring that States accepting such 
funds comply with the conditions on their use.”109   
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103 Id. 
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105 Id. at 2608 (“As for the Medicaid expansion, that portion of the Affordable 
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 After the Health Care Cases, then, the states have a choice—or, 
really, two choices.  They can choose whether to continue participating 
in the pre-ACA Medicaid program, according to the conditions 
previously laid down by Congress.  And they can choose whether to 
participate in the Act’s expansion of Medicaid, according to the terms 
set out in the ACA.110 
III.  THE NEW MEANING OF COMMANDS (AND COMMANDEERING) 
 The Court’s decision in the Health Care Cases was the first in 
United States history to invalidate a federal spending provision on the 
ground that it coerced the states, and it immediately sent 
constitutional lawyers scurrying to identify other programs that may 
now be constitutionally suspect.111  As others have explained, the 
decision could mark a sea change in the scope of Congress’s spending 
power; significant aspects of major federal statutes, such as the Clean 
Air Act or the No Child Left Behind Act, may now be 
unconstitutional.112   But the decision’s implications do not stop there.  
Properly understood, the underlying rationale of the Court’s Medicaid 
holding concerns not so much Congress’s spending authority, but the 
                                                          
110 See Where Each State Stands on ACA’s Medicaid Expansion, THE 
ADVISORY BOARD COMPANY (Jul. 17, 2012, 3:00 PM), 
http://www.advisory.com/Daily-Briefing/2012/07/05/Where-each-state-stands-
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Pear & Michael Cooper, Reluctance in Some States Over Medicaid Expansion, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 29, 2012).  
111 See Adler & Stewart, supra note 15; Nicole Huberfield, Starting to Work 
Beneath the Surface of the Medicaid Holding, CONCURRING OPINIONS, June 
29, 2012, available at 
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conditional spending programs include educational funding, transportation 
funding, environmental protection laws, and welfare laws, just to name a 
few.”). 
112 See id. 
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broader issue of what constitutes a federal “command” to the states.  
In fine, the Health Care Cases re-conceptualized what qualifies as 
federal compulsion, and thus extended the reach of the anti-
commandeering doctrine.  
 To see this, it is important to deconstruct exactly why the Court 
found the ACA’s Medicaid provisions unconstitutional.  The ultimate 
constitutional problem was that the Act commandeered the states—in 
the words of the Chief Justice, it “‘require[d] the States to govern 
according to Congress’ instructions.’”113  But the ACA did not formally 
require the states to do anything with respect to Medicaid; as a strictly 
legal matter, the states were free to walk away from the program if 
they so desired.114  Nonetheless, the Court treated the conditions that 
the ACA attached to the states’ existing Medicaid funds as obligations 
because, given the practical realities facing the states, they had no 
“genuine choice” or “real option” but to accept Congress’s conditions.115   
 The critical move in the Court’s analysis, then, was how it framed 
the inquiry as to whether a federal law “commands” the states.  The 
Health Care Cases hold that the answer turns on more than legal 
form.  The inquiry is now a practical one:  All things considered, do the 
states have a genuine choice and a real option of rejecting the federal 
government’s conditions?  If the states lack the practical ability to say 
no, the federal law—even if it imposes no formal legal obligations on 
the states—must be understood as issuing a command.  And if that 
command requires the states to take affirmative acts in their 
sovereign capacities, then the federal law violates the anti-
commandeering principle. 
  Again, the greatest practical significance of this holding lies in its 
application to federal-state conditional spending programs, the precise 
context in which the case arose.  Because of the severe financial 
consequences the states would suffer in withdrawing from various 
                                                          
113 National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 
2602 (2012) (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 162 (1992)). 
114 See, e.g., Brief for Respondents (Medicaid) at 17, Florida v. Dept. of Health 
& Human Servs., No. 11–400 (S. Ct. Feb. 2012) (“Petitioners do not dispute 
that they are free, as a matter of law, to turn down federal Medicaid funds if  
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federal grant-in-aid programs, several such programs may now be 
vulnerable to constitutional challenges.  But the rationale of the 
Health Care Cases extends further.  It applies to any federal law in 
which two conditions hold: (1) the law presents the states with a 
choice, and (2) one of the alternatives is for the states to govern 
according to Congress’s instructions.  As such, this new conception of 
“commands” applies as much to conditional prohibitions as it does to 
conditional enticements.  Just as the states might lack a real choice of 
withdrawing from a federal spending program, they might likewise 
lack the practical capacity to step aside and not govern in a particular 
field.  If so, laws previously understood to be perfectly constitutional—
as uncontroversial instances of the conditional federal preemption of 
state law—may now amount to impermissible commandeerings. 
 As an illustration, suppose Congress enacts a statute that forbids 
the states from governing on the subject of X unless they do so 
according to federal instructions A, B, and C.  Prior to the Health Care 
Cases, the statute would have been understood as simply prohibitory, 
and hence constitutional.  It does not formally command the states to 
do anything, but merely preempts certain state laws (those governing 
on the subject of X) that do not conform to a set of federal norms 
(articulated in instructions A, B, and C).  As explained in New York, 
the Supreme Court has long “recognized Congress’ power to offer 
States the choice of regulating [an] activity according to federal 
standards or having state law pre-empted by federal regulation.”116  If 
a state’s inhabitants “would prefer their government to devote its 
attention and resources to problems other than those deemed 
important by Congress, they may choose to have the Federal 
Government rather than the State bear the expense of a federally 
mandated regulatory program.”117  In other words, the states can 
simply choose to step aside and do nothing at all.   
 The Health Care Cases disrupt this understanding.  If the states 
have no “genuine choice” but to govern on the subject of X—for 
whatever set of practical reasons—then they lack any “real option” of 
stepping aside and doing nothing.  Instead, the federal statute is 
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effectively requiring the states to act, and to act according to federal 
instructions A, B, and C.  The federal law “dragoons” the states into 
governing according to Congress’s directives.  
   To be sure, the vast majority of federal statutes conditionally 
preempting state law are almost certainly still constitutional, even 
after the Health Care Cases, because they leave the states a legitimate 
choice not to govern on Congress’s terms.  To pick just one example 
(from hundreds), consider the Federal Boat Safety Act of 1971, which 
directs states to “not establish, continue in effect, or enforce a law or 
regulation establishing a recreational vessel or associated equipment 
performance or other safety standard or imposing a requirement for 
associated equipment . . . that is not identical to a regulation 
prescribed” by the Coast Guard.118  Whatever “genuine choice” might 
mean, exactly, state governments surely have the practical capacity 
not to regulate on the subjects of power boat safety already covered by 
a Coast Guard regulation.  No state could plausibly claim that the 
Federal Boat Safety Act effectively compels it to enact regulations 
identical to those prescribed by the federal government.   
 But many cases will not be so easy.  Consider the following, 
somewhat fanciful hypothetical.  Suppose that Congress generally 
would like the possession, sale, and distribution of illicit narcotics 
(such as cocaine, methamphetamine, and marijuana) to be criminally 
prohibited.  But Congress has also concluded that, due to mounting 
budget pressures, the cost of investigating, prosecuting, and 
incarcerating persons committing these crimes is simply too expensive 
for the federal government to bear.  Thus, Congress replaces the 
existing federal Controlled Substances Act119 with a statute offering 
the states the following choice: (1) they can enact and enforce a state-
level Controlled Substances Act (the provisions of which mirror the 
current federal law), or (2) they can step aside and do nothing, in 
which case federal law will completely preempt the field.  Because of 
federal budget constraints, though, the federal preemption of a given 
state’s law will essentially mean that drug trafficking and possession 
will go unpunished within that state’s borders.   
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 The statute formally offers the states a choice.  But as a practical 
matter, state governments may find it impossible to endure an 
unregulated market in illicit narcotics, especially if that conduct is 
tightly regulated in the states surrounding them (making their 
jurisdictions a magnet for the drug market).  Thus, the choice the 
federal law offers the states may not be genuine; state governments 
may have no “real option” but to accede to Congress’s conditions and 
implement the prescribed federal regulatory program.  If so, the 
Health Care Cases dictate that this hypothetical federal statute has 
commanded the states to act affirmatively in regulating under 
Congress’s direction, and is thus an unconstitutional commandeering.  
 We can imagine other examples, but the broader point is this:  The 
Health Care Cases have qualitatively changed the meaning of the anti-
commandeering principle.  Because the inquiry as to whether a federal 
law amounts to compulsion is now practical in nature, statutes 
formally offering the states a choice may nonetheless be treated as 
issuing the states commands.  And if those commands require the 
states affirmatively to govern in a particular fashion—whether framed 
as conditions attached to federal funds, or as conditions precedent to 
avoiding federal preemption—they amount to impermissible 
commandeerings.  
IV. A CASE STUDY: THE FEDERAL REGULATION OF STATE TAXATION 
 Presently, it is unclear how much this new understanding of the 
anti-commandeering doctrine will actually constrain Congress’s 
legislative authority.  Much depends on how the Supreme Court 
ultimately defines the concept of “genuine choice” (or “real option”), a 
matter the Health Care Cases left quite opaque.120  As the Chief 
Justice wrote, “[w]e have no need to fix a line” that defines “where 
                                                          
120 See Friedman, supra note 5 (after the Health Care Cases, “the line 
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not, remains hard to identify with precision”); Huberfield, supra note 111 
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persuasion gives way to coercion. . . . It is enough for today that 
wherever that line may be, this statute is surely beyond it.”121   
 What makes a state’s option “real” might turn on whether the 
financial consequences are simply too large for a state realistically to 
reject Congress’s conditions.  (This was largely the problem with the 
ACA’s Medicaid provisions.122)  Or it might depend on whether the 
states have already invested substantially in the administration and 
implementation of the affected program—whether they “have 
developed intricate statutory and administrative regimes over the 
course of many decades to implement their objectives.”123  (This, too, 
was a problem with the ACA cited in the Health Care Cases.124)  Or it 
could hinge, at least to some degree, on whether the subject at issue is 
central to a state’s existence as an independent sovereign, a factor the 
Court has considered in resolving other questions of constitutional 
federalism.125  
 In all events, there is at least one important area where the new 
meaning of commandeering would seem unquestionably to apply—
where the financial consequences to the states are potentially 
enormous, where the states have developed intricate statutory and 
administrative regimes over the course of many decades, and where 
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the subject matter is core to the states’ sovereignty.  And that is the 
field of state and local taxation.   
A.  State and local taxation in the United States 
At this point, a brief primer on state and local taxes is in order.  
State and local governments impose a wide variety of taxes, all of 
which have some impact on interstate commerce.  As of 2008 (the 
latest year for which the relevant data are available), the most 
significant subnational taxes were those imposed on sales and gross 
receipts ($449 billion), property ($410 billion), personal income ($305 
billion), and corporate income ($58 billion).126  All told, state and local 
governments collected more than $1.3 trillion in tax revenue in 2008, 
accounting for more than one third of the tax burden in the United 
States.127  
Given our federal structure, states have an inherent incentive to 
minimize the tax burden borne by their own residents while, at the 
same time, maximizing their collection of revenue.  Thus, states are 
constantly devising tax schemes that, in one way or another, burden 
or discriminate against interstate commerce.128  Historically, our 
constitutional system’s principal means for policing this parochial 
behavior has been through the judiciary’s enforcement of the dormant 
Commerce Clause.  Going back to its 1852 decision in Cooley v. Board 
of Wardens,129 the Supreme Court has invoked the Commerce Clause 
to invalidate state or local laws that interfered with the creation of a 
common national market, free from state or local trade barriers.130  
And the Court has used the dormant Commerce Clause specifically to 
invalidate state or local tax measures since at least 1872.131  
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The Court’s application of the dormant Commerce Clause to state 
and local taxes has hardly followed a steady path.  As the justices 
observed a half-century ago, despite having by then “handed down 
some three-hundred full-dress opinions” on the subject, their decisions 
“have been ‘not always clear . . . consistent or reconcilable.’”132  Still, 
the basic thrust has always been to protect interstate commerce from 
taxes that operate to protect or advantage in-state economic 
interests.133  Presently, the Court applies a four-part test134 first fully 
articulated in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady.135  Under 
Complete Auto, a state or local tax imposed on interstate commerce 
“will not survive Commerce Clause scrutiny if the taxpayer 
demonstrates that the tax (1) applies to an activity lacking a 
substantial nexus to the taxing State; (2) is not fairly apportioned; (3) 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Freight Tax . . . first unequivocally announced and squarely applied the 
doctrine that the Commerce Clause by its own force limits state tax power 
over interstate commerce.”). 
132 Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota 358 U.S. 450, 
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discriminates against interstate commerce; or (4) is not fairly related 
to the services provided by the State.”136  The Court has used these 
criteria to invalidate scores of state or local taxes. 
Importantly, though, the federal judiciary is not the only national 
institution involved in protecting interstate commerce from 
overweening state and local taxation.  At least since the 1950s, 
Congress has also played a role, enacting a number of statutes 
regulating how state and local governments impose specific levies.  
For example, Public Law 86–272 provides that “[n]o State, or political 
subdivision thereof, shall have power to impose . . . a net income tax 
on the income derived within such State” when the taxpayer limits its 
activities in that state to “the solicitation of orders . . . for tangible 
personal property.”137  The Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory 
Reform Act forbids states from imposing any tax “that discriminates 
against a rail carrier,”138 and subsequent amendments forbid similar 
discrimination against motor carriers139 or air carriers.140  The 
Internet Tax Freedom Act states that “[n]o State or political 
subdivision thereof shall impose any . . . [t]axes on Internet access” or 
“[m]ultiple or discriminatory taxes on electronic commerce.”141  And 
the State Taxation of Pension Income Act of 1995 provides that “[n]o 
State may impose an income tax on any retirement income of an 
individual who is not a resident or domiciliary of such State (as 
determined under the laws of such State).”142 
The Supreme Court has long held that the Commerce Clause 
grants Congress the authority to enact these sorts of statutes—
statutes regulating how states and their political subdivisions tax 
persons or entities engaged in interstate commerce.  Consider the 
Court’s 1978 decision in Moorman Manufacturing v. Bair.143  At issue 
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was Iowa’s method of apportioning the income of multistate 
businesses for purposes of the state’s corporate income tax.  Unlike 
other states, Iowa computed a taxpayer’s income attributable to Iowa 
based entirely on the proportion of the taxpayer’s sales to Iowa 
customers.144  Given other states’ use of multi-factor apportionment 
formulas, the practical effect of Iowa’s scheme was to subject many 
out-of-state corporations to state-level taxation on more than 100 
percent of their income.145  It also created a financial incentive for out-
of-state businesses to locate their property and jobs in Iowa.146   
Nonetheless, the Court rejected the taxpayers’ challenge to Iowa’s 
scheme.  The justices did not really deny that Iowa’s single-factor 
sales apportionment scheme effectively produced multiple taxation, or 
that this multiple taxation potentially discriminated against 
interstate commerce.  Rather, the Court explained that, whatever the 
substantive merits of the out-of-state businesses’ complaint, Congress 
was the institution to solve the problem:  “It is clear that the 
legislative power granted to Congress by the Commerce Clause of the 
Constitution would amply justify the enactment of legislation 
requiring all States to adhere to uniform rules for the division of 
income.  It is to that body, and not this Court, that the Constitution 
has committed such policy decisions.”147 
Or consider the Court’s 1992 decision in Quill Corp. v. North 
Dakota.148  The question there was whether North Dakota could 
require out-of-state sellers lacking any “physical presence” in the state 
to collect use taxes on sales to North Dakota customers.149  Critically, 
the Court had held twenty-five years earlier, in National Bellas Hess, 
Inc. v. Department of Revenue,150 that the imposition of a collection 
obligation under these circumstances was unconstitutional.151  In 
Quill, the Court overruled Bellas Hess to the extent it had relied on 
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principles of due process, but it retained Bellas Hess’s physical 
presence requirement under the dormant Commerce Clause.152  As in 
Moorman, the Court explained that Congress was the appropriate 
institution to balance the relevant considerations:  “[T]he underlying 
issue is not only one that Congress may be better qualified to resolve, 
but also one that Congress has the ultimate power to resolve.  No 
matter how we evaluate the burdens that use taxes impose on 
interstate commerce, Congress remains free to disagree with our 
conclusions.”153 
There are several other examples, but the basic point is clear.  As 
the leading treatise in the field sums up, “Congress possesses 
unquestioned power under the Commerce Clause to regulate state 
taxation of interstate commerce.”154 
B.  Applying the new understanding 
The Supreme Court has never explicitly discussed how federal 
statutes that regulate state and local taxation are compatible with the 
anti-commandeering principle.  But synthesizing these two doctrines 
is relatively straightforward—or at least it was before the Health Care 
Cases.   
Again, none of these federal statutes, in express terms, requires a 
state or local government to impose a given tax.  Instead, these laws 
all take the form of conditional prohibitions.  Consider the Mobile 
Telecommunications Sourcing Act (or MTSA).155  It provides (in 
relevant part) that, “[n]otwithstanding the law of any State or political 
subdivision of any State, mobile telecommunications services provided 
in a taxing jurisdiction to a customer, the charges for which are billed 
by or for the customer’s home service provider, shall be deemed to be 
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provided by the customer’s home service provider.”156  The MTSA does 
not force the states to tax mobile communications.  But if they choose 
to do so, they must implement the specific sourcing rules prescribed by 
Congress.   
Conceptualized this way, federal statutes regulating state and 
local taxation are no more than a garden-variety species of 
preemption.  They effectively nullify—or preempt—state or local taxes 
failing to conform to a particular federal norm.  As with federal laws 
preempting other forms of state regulation, federal statutes regulating 
state and local taxation always afford state and local governments the 
option to step aside and do nothing at all.  A state that does not like 
the MTSA’s sourcing rules, for instance, can simply decide not to tax 
mobile telecommunication services.  In this way, Congress has not 
commanded the states to take any affirmative acts, and the federal 
statutes cannot be understood as commandeerings.   
As should now be clear, the Health Care Cases upend this 
understanding.  To repeat, the ratio decidendi of the Court’s Medicaid 
holding is that any federal law regulating the conduct of the states 
that does not offer the states a genuine, practical choice but to comply 
with Congress’s conditions must be understood as a federal command.  
This means that, if Congress regulates a state tax that the state 
practically has “no option” but to impose—and thus is forced to 
implement on Congress’s terms—the federal law necessarily 
constitutes a commandeering.   
Consider, for example, a federal statute regulating the states’ 
division of income for purposes of business activity taxes (such as 
corporate income taxes), precisely the type of law contemplated by the 
Court in Moorman.  Such a statute would generally consist of the 
following: (1) a prescription of uniform rules for the apportionment of 
business income (i.e., income earned in the ordinary operation of the 
enterprise); (2) definitions of the factors—such as sales, property, and 
payroll—that form the prescribed formula; and (3) a set of rules for 
allocating businesses’ non-business income (i.e., non-operational, 
investment income).  Now assume, reasonably enough, that several 
states depend heavily on their business activity tax revenue—perhaps 
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that this revenue (much like federal Medicaid reimbursements) 
constitutes close to 10 percent of their annual budgets.  The logic of 
the Health Care Cases dictates that the states may have no “genuine 
choice” but to continue imposing their business activity taxes.  As a 
result, Congress’s prescriptions as to how states are to apportion 
business income, define the relevant apportionment factors, and 
allocate non-business income would all constitute federal commands—
commands forcing states to act affirmatively in their sovereign 
capacities.  As such, the precise sort of federal law endorsed by the 
Court in Moorman would constitute a commandeering. 
Or suppose Congress enacted a statute similar to that 
contemplated by the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement 
(SSUTA),157 a plan collectively developed over the past decade by state 
tax administrators and other stakeholders.  Such a law would require 
states imposing sales and use taxes to implement and enforce a 
variety of provisions, such as (1) greater uniformity in the applicable 
tax rate,158 (2) state-level uniformity in the tax base,159 (3) uniform 
rules for determining where covered transactions occur,160 and (4) 
uniform definitions of items commonly exempted from sales taxes 
(such as groceries and medical supplies).161  Again, many states that 
currently impose sales and use taxes might well find it practically 
impossible to forego the revenue those taxes generate.  As a result, a 
federal law requiring the states to conform their sales tax schemes to 
the basic provisions of the SSUTA would, under the rationale of the 
Health Care Cases, amount to a command.  And because that 
command would force the states affirmatively to govern according to 
Congress’s instructions, it would amount to a commandeering. 
These are just two possibilities.  The larger point is that, whenever 
a state depends significantly on the revenue a given tax generates, a 
federal law prescribing the terms on which that tax can be 
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implemented is now constitutionally suspect.  One might try to argue 
that taxing is not really governing, such that federal laws dictating 
how states are to implement their tax schemes simply fall outside the 
ambit of the anti-commandeering principle.  But that seems 
implausible.  If implementing a spending program that provides 
health insurance to the indigent counts as “governance”—as the Court 
concluded in the Health Care Cases—so must the imposition of taxes.  
Indeed, how a state decides to tax its residents would seem to fall 
closer to the core of its sovereignty than how it distributes a benefit 
like health coverage.     
C.  Some practical consequences 
 The example of federal statutes that regulate state and local 
taxation serves not just to illustrate how the Health Care Cases have 
altered the contours of the anti-commandeering principle.  It also 
reveals an unfortunate (and likely unintended) consequence of the 
Court’s decision:  It may seriously fetter Congress’s authority to 
address the many problems plaguing the Nation’s state and local tax 
system.  And as the Court itself has often acknowledged, Congress is 
much better situated than the judiciary to devise solutions to these 
complex problems.   
 Complications of measurement make it impossible to know for 
certain, but it is likely that state and local tax schemes impose billions 
of dollars in needless costs on the United States economy.  Consider 
the following four pathologies, all of which are largely endemic to our 
federal structure. 
 1.  Disadvantaging interstate commerce. — State governments 
have an inherent political incentive to design their tax systems to 
provide competitive advantages to in-state taxpayers and to maximize 
the economic incidence of their taxes on out-of-state taxpayers.  Of 
course, the judicial enforcement of the dormant Commerce Clause can 
stymie blatant forms of such discrimination.  But subtler practices—
the single-factor apportionment of business income at issue in 
Moorman, for example, or the common game of imposing higher sales 
tax rates on hotels and rental cars—routinely disadvantage commerce 
that crosses state lines.  This tax favoritism is obviously inefficient; it 
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reduces the aggregate social gains from trade by favoring higher-cost, 
local businesses at the expense of more efficient, out-of-state firms.   
 2.  Locational distortions. — Relatedly, state tax schemes (again, 
like the single-factor apportionment formula at issue in Moorman) 
tend to distort taxpayers’ locational decisions, inducing states to locate 
their facilities and jobs in particular jurisdictions.  This, too, results in 
deadweight loss, as it induces behavior not because of its underlying 
economic sense but purely due to its tax consequences.  Of course, 
many of these locational distortions are unavoidable, given that states 
have broad discretion to pursue differing tax policies.  But federal 
legislation can constrain that discretion in constructive ways, and 
thereby reduce the size of these distortions. 
 3.  Undertaxation and the underproduction of public goods. —
Presently, state and local governments have a strong incentive to 
compete with one another for mobile taxpayers—specifically, business 
enterprises and affluent individuals.  Under the right conditions, this 
competition can be healthy for the economy.  But because the states 
are generally incapable of coordinating their tax policies, they cannot 
bind each other to any ground rules to govern their tax competition.  
This collective action problem creates a sort of prisoner’s dilemma, in 
which the states are apt to tax mobile taxpayers more lightly than 
they sincerely prefer.162  The likely result is that the states collect a 
less-than-optimal amount of revenue, and consequently produce a 
suboptimal level of public goods (such as education, health care, and 
police protection).  This, too, is a loss to aggregate social welfare.   
 4.  Planning and compliance costs. — Finally, non-uniform state 
and local taxes—the varying schemes, rules, and definitions splayed 
out across more than 7,500 distinct taxing jurisdictions163—forces 
taxpayers to devote substantial resources to tax planning and 
compliance.164  The present level of non-uniformity requires taxpayers 
to maintain a working knowledge of hundreds of different tax regimes; 
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engage in multiple, overlapping calculations of their liabilities; 
maintain separate sets of records (given the varying definitions of 
salient tax attributes, such as basis); and file hundreds (if not 
thousands) of different forms.165  It also encourages taxpayers to 
engage the assistance of lawyers, accountants, and consultants to 
devise sophisticated tax minimization strategies.  To be sure, every 
tax system entails planning and compliance costs.  But the number 
and heterogeneity of taxing jurisdictions in the United States 
increases those costs exponentially. 
 
*    *    * 
 
 In short, the negative wealth effects attributable to the state and 
local tax system—caused by the states’ strategic behavior, state-level 
collective action problems, and the non-uniformity of state and local 
tax regimes—are likely substantial.  It is therefore unsurprising that 
Congress has considered several measures to regulate state and local 
taxes in recent years.  Proposed legislation includes the Business 
Activity Tax Simplification Act, which would clarify when states have 
jurisdiction to impose income taxes on out-of-state firms166; the Mobile 
Workforce State Income Tax Fairness and Simplification Act, which 
would specify rules governing state jurisdiction to tax the income of 
individuals performing services in more than one state167; the 
Telecommuter Tax Fairness Act, which would define the 
circumstances under which a state could tax the income of an 
individual whose professional office address is located in the taxing 
state, but who performs her work at home in another state168; and the 
Sales Tax Fairness and Simplification Act, which would grant 
Congress’s consent to the terms of the SSUTA.169 
 The logic of the Health Care Cases, however, means that some of 
these proposals may well be unconstitutional.  Indeed, by expanding 
the breadth of the anti-commandeering principle, the Court may have 
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disempowered Congress from enacting any legislation prescribing the 
terms on which states can implement taxes on which they currently 
depend.  This could be quite unfortunate, for as the justices have 
frequently acknowledged, Congress is much better suited than the 
courts to address these complicated problems of tax policy.170  As 
Justice Black cogently observed more than sixty years ago in 
McCarroll v. Dixie Greyhound Lines,171 “Congress alone can, in the 
exercise of its plenary constitutional control over interstate commerce, 
not only consider whether such a tax as now under scrutiny is 
consistent with the best interests of our national economy, but can 
also on the basis of full exploration of the many aspects of a 
complicated problem devise a national policy fair alike to the State 
and our Union.”172 
 To be sure, Congress’s solutions will not be perfect.  But as a 
matter of comparative institutional competence, Congress is much 
better positioned than the judiciary to devise detailed, prospective 
rules that are tailored to the intricacies of state and local taxation.   
CONCLUSION 
 The Supreme Court’s decision in the Health Care Cases was hugely 
important—for health policy, for constitutional law, and for the 
Supreme Court.  Its consequences are likely to reverberate for years.  
One of those consequences is that the Court effectively re-
conceptualized what constitutes a federal command to the states.  
Regardless of the legislative authority Congress has invoked, a federal 
law leaving the states no “genuine choice” but to accede to Congress’s 
conditions must be understood as a command.  And if that command 
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requires the states to act affirmatively in their sovereign capacities, it 
amounts to an unconstitutional commandeering. 
 It is unclear how many federal laws might be jeopardized by the 
Court’s decision.  The answer largely depends on the sorts of practical 
circumstances leading the Court to conclude that the states lack a 
“legitimate choice” or “real option.”  But one place this new 
understanding plainly matters is in assessing the constitutionality of 
federal laws that regulate state and local taxation.  If a state relies 
heavily on a particular tax, the Health Care Cases suggest that a 
federal statute prescribing the manner in which that tax is to be 
imposed constitutes a command, and thus a commandeering. 
 There is some irony here.  Several commentators have criticized 
the Court’s decision for unjustifiably expanding the government’s 
authority to tax, pointing to the opinion’s broad construction of 
Congress’s taxing power in sustaining the ACA’s minimum coverage 
provision.173  These critics may be right, but perhaps not for the 
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reason they have identified.  The more acute tax problem created by 
the Court’s holding may instead lie in its new understanding of 
commandeering. 
